This will in future be all the more the case when troops of lower quality, and therefore more liable to become shaken and dispirited, have to be employed. Reserve formations--Landwehr and the like--which under favourable conditions might render excellent service, when once beaten, without officers, weary and hungry, lose all cohesion, when, with baggage, wounded, and stragglers, they are driven back over crowded roads; and then, no matter how well they are armed, they are an easy prey to a pursuing Cavalry. The man who throws his rifle away or shoots in the air will not find salvation either in clip-loading or smokeless powder against the lance in the hands of a relentless pursuing Cavalry. The same holds good for the fight itself. We cannot attack even inferior Infantry as long as it only keeps the muzzles of its rifles down and shoots straight; but once it is morally broken and surprised, then the greatest results are still to be achieved even on an open battle-field. That, at least, the campaign of 1870-1871 sufficiently proved, although the Cavalry were so seldom allowed the opportunity to reap the ripe harvest our strategy and the action of the other Arms had so abundantly prepared for them. A further point in our favour is to be found in the fact that the increased power of modern Artillery fire has rendered the defence of villages and woods practically an impossibility. The Infantry are thus compelled to seek open but rolling ground, and it is precisely such ground which favours the concealed approach and sudden attack of the Cavalry; but surprise is the very essence of successful Cavalry action. If we bring together all these points of view which have been hitherto only indicated, we find, on the one hand, the absolute fighting value of the Cavalry has considerably diminished, and that in modern War the conditions of Cavalry employment will in every direction be rendered more difficult; on the other hand, the strategical importance of the Arm, as well as the scope of the duties which it may be called upon to fulfil, have increased very decidedly, and very important new opportunities for successes have been thrown open to it. We cannot sufficiently insist upon the cumulative effects which all these general changes in the nature of War have exercised upon the Cavalry Arm; for not only has public opinion taken up the opposite view, but even in the Army itself these positive views have not received the attention they deserve.