Now, the Cavalry can hardly expect to attain more--indeed, it is doubtful whether they would succeed even in confirming what is already known, for the difficulties to be overcome, as we have seen, are numerous, and nowhere can one find completed situations from which to make reliable deductions. At most they can determine that certain places are already occupied, and that the traffic on certain lines is considerable, things that one knew _a priori_, which, therefore, are not worth any serious sacrifice. Moreover, it is exceedingly doubtful whether, at such an early period, when conditions are changing from day to day, such information has any practical value. Of course, it is not intended to maintain that one should not from the very first moment after the declaration of War keep a sharp look-out upon the enemy, work up to him, and seek to determine as much as rapidity and daring can succeed, with any probability of success, in attaining--that goes without saying. Particular value will always attach to the taking of prisoners, whose regimental numbers enable us to check the accuracy of our existing information. But against this we must emphasize all the more forcibly that in this first period of hostilities an inundation of the enemy's zone of concentration with masses or by far-flung lines of patrols is not only not expedient, but absolutely detrimental, since the certain cost of such undertakings stands in no reasonable proportion to the probably negative, or at most insignificant, result to be expected. Further, our own concentration has already been so prepared in peace that it must be carried out with clock-like regularity, even should the results of the reconnaissance disclose that the conditions on the side of the enemy were not quite those that we had originally expected. Even the mere transference backwards of the line of strategic deployment, which in 1870 could still be carried out without serious difficulties or drawbacks, could nowadays, in view of the high tension induced by modern conditions, only be executed with extraordinary difficulty, whilst lateral displacement of such numbers is quite inconceivable. For even if the railway organization would suffice for the execution of such a design, the many other preparations in the zone of concentration can neither be moved nor improvised. Summarizing the whole question, the conclusion, I think, must be, that only that Army which has at its disposal a great preponderance of Cavalry could allow itself the luxury of such premature commitment of its mounted forces.