If the changed conditions of modern war have brought about new conditions and demands which require to be considered in the strategical combinations of the Cavalry, I believe that a similar influence must make itself felt in the field of tactics. Whereas formerly the _arme blanche_ was recognized as the principal method by which the Cavalry made its inherent fighting power felt, the employment of dismounted action nowadays has gained in importance to such an extent that the whole character of our activity appears completely changed. Although hitherto the general conception has been that Cavalry should only make use of the carbine for defence, nowadays its employment in attack must be recognized as of the utmost importance. Undoubtedly, however, it is, and must remain even to-day, the chief aim of every leader in whose veins flows the hot Cavalry blood to seize his opportunities wherever they offer themselves, and, above all, to attack the enemy's Cavalry wherever and whenever accessible with cold steel; but we cannot conceal from ourselves the fact that nowadays numerous problems will present themselves to the Cavalry which can only be solved by fire action. In the first place, the opportunity will often arise for the weaker side to avoid an encounter in the open field, and, with the help of its firearm, at least to attempt behind defiles, or strong positions, to defy the enemy's superior forces. In such cases the assailant also will be compelled to have recourse to his carbine. Further considerations reveal that in future, quite apart from encounter with the enemy's Cavalry, our own horsemen will find tasks before them which will make appeal to the rifle inevitable. The enemy will cover his railways, and important depots by troops of the second and third class. Reinforced by the resisting power of popular levies, they will block woods, river crossings, and defiles. Even the guards of their Convoys will be amply provided with far-ranging firearms. In the pursuit of an enemy's beaten Cavalry we shall happen upon Infantry detachments sent out to cover their retreat, or upon defiles which have been occupied for a similar purpose. Important communications will be held by strong detachments of cyclist Infantry, who will find in woods and villages protection and favourable opportunities to use their weapons. All these means of resistance lie beyond the field of mounted action, but they must be overcome if success is to crown our efforts.