In this direction the horsemen of Stuart and Sheridan have set us a brilliant example, taking part on foot in regular pitched battles (Stuart at Fredericksburg, and Sheridan at Five Forks), and deciding, rifle in hand, the fate of numerous engagements, in order immediately afterwards to mount and pursue the enemy by a succession of vehement charges (Stuart at Brandy Station). The South African War also has shown us what can be done by a mounted force supplied with a reliable firearm. The Boers fought exclusively as Cavalry (_sic_), supported by Artillery, and some of the most celebrated British Infantry regiments suffered defeat at their hands as long as the numerical proportion was not altogether too unfavourable to the assailants. Even in dismounted attack, particularly in the later period of the war, they often attained very considerable successes, and thus proved incontrovertibly that the double role of Cavalry on foot and on horseback is thoroughly practical; for even the charge itself of these same Boers often achieved brilliant results, although they were lacking in any kind of tactical training for this particular result.[4] [Footnote 4: I venture to differ from the author. The Boers did not fight as Cavalry. Their whole tactics were those of Mounted Infantry. They did on one or two occasions bring about a decision by rifle fire from their horses, but I can recall no instance where they actually charged--_i.e._, endeavoured to decide the action by shock.--C. S. G.] Certainly weapons and numbers have altered materially since the days of the American Civil War, and the experiences of South Africa, largely conditioned by the peculiar topographical conditions and the out-of-door habits and sporting instincts of the Boers, cannot be transferred to European circumstance without important modifications. But even in Europe the Cavalry retain, thanks to their mobility, their power of opening fire in a manner calculated to create the greatest degree of surprise against the flanks and rear of the enemy as soon as they make up their minds to cut themselves adrift from their own Army, and get in rear of the enemy's troops. Such enterprises offer the best guarantee of producing a great moral result. The history of the Franco-German War demonstrated this possibility. What might not our Cavalry have achieved in 1870-1871 against the undisciplined forces of the Republic had they been provided with a good firearm, and sought of a set purpose for such opportunities?