I. THE MODERN CONDITIONS OF WAR, AND THEIR INFLUENCE ON THE EMPLOYMENT AND USEFULNESS OF CAVALRY 3 II. DUTIES AT THE BEGINNING AND DURING THE COURSE OF THE WAR 19 III. STRATEGICAL DISTRIBUTION OF THE CAVALRY 38 IV. INCREASED IMPORTANCE OF DISMOUNTED ACTION 49 V. THE TACTICAL LEADING IN MOUNTED COMBATS 62 VI. TACTICAL CONDUCT OF DISMOUNTED ACTIONS 90 VII. STRATEGICAL EMPLOYMENT OF CAVALRY 104 VIII. PATROLS--TRANSMISSION OF REPORTS--CYCLISTS 132 PART II ORGANIZATION AND TRAINING I. NUMBERS 151 II. RIDING, FEEDING, AND TRAINING 184 III. THE TRAINING FOR MOUNTED COMBAT 213 IV. TRAINING FOR DISMOUNTED FIGHTING 247 V. FIELD-SERVICE TRAINING AND MANOEUVRES 265 VI. THE HIGHER EDUCATION OF OUR OFFICERS 286 CONCLUSION 294 INDEX 298 INTRODUCTION General von Bernhardi's work, 'Cavalry in Future Wars' (translated from the German by Mr. C. S. Goldman), is a most valuable addition to modern Cavalry literature, and appears at an opportune moment to counteract and dispel some misleading conclusions which have been drawn by certain writers (both English and foreign) from reported operations in the late Manchurian War. One or two distinguished foreign soldiers who have publicly commented upon that campaign have said that what is termed the 'Cavalry spirit' is opposed to the idea of dismounted action. They hold that the Cavalry disdain to dismount, and they see in riding the end instead of the means. They consider that events in the Far East teach us that we must render our Cavalry less devoted to 'manoeuvres' and to 'tournaments,' in order to enable them to fit themselves to take part in modern fighting; that the times have come when the methods of Warfare should be changed; and that the Cavalry must determine to defeat the enemy by dismounted action entirely. I cannot speak with any certainty as to what has happened in European Armies, but as regards the British Cavalry, I am absolutely convinced that the Cavalry spirit is and may be encouraged to the utmost without in the least degree prejudicing either training in dismounted duties or the acquirement of such tactical knowledge on the part of leaders as will enable them to discern when and where to resort to dismounted methods.