In recommending the study of the book to all British soldiers, I would draw particular attention to the author's constant and repeated references to the necessity of first seeking out and fighting the hostile Cavalry and driving them from the field--in other words, to the immediate and complete attainment of the moral superiority. In support of his opinions, he reminds us forcibly that the important results gained by the German Cavalry in the 1870-1871 campaign were due to the absence of opposition on the part of the French Cavalry more than to anything else, and he contends that in future Wars, where the Cavalry on either side have been properly trained as such, this supremacy will have to be fought for, and will involve an enormous increase in the difficulty with which the Cavalry Arm will carry out its role. He scoffs at the idea held by so many 'amateurs' that 'Cavalry duels' are superfluous. Only those who have led Cavalry on active service in the field, and have been charged with their training in peace-time, can realize to the full the absolute soundness of the conclusions at which General von Bernhardi has arrived, and it is much to be feared that the mischievous teaching which scoffs at 'manoeuvres,' 'tournaments,' and the 'Cavalry spirit,' proceeds almost entirely from the pens and from the brains of men who have no practical knowledge of the handling of the Cavalry Arm. The great value of this book to the British Cavalry officer of to-day seems to me to lie in the fact that this particular vein of thought and argument pervades it throughout. The General tells us, with the soundest arguments and the most positive proofs, that 'the brilliant field of enterprise which is open to the Cavalry soldier in his role as a mounted rifleman can only be attained by him when he has overthrown the enemy's Cavalry.' The author, having unmistakably insisted upon the preliminary overthrow of the enemy's Cavalry, proceeds to vindicate the idea that the Cavalry spirit is in any degree opposed to the idea of dismounted action when necessary. On the contrary, he declares emphatically that the Cavalry fight is only a means to an end, and that the hostile Cavalry once disposed of by means of horse and cold steel alone, a brilliant role lies open to that Arm by reason of their possession of an efficient firearm, in the use of which the cavalryman has received a thorough training. The great difficulty, he tells us, lies in the necessity of discovering a Leader who possesses the 'power of holding the balance correctly between fire power and shock, and in the training for the former never to allow troops to lose confidence in the latter.' 'Whether,' says the General, 'it be in the working out of some strategical design, or in joining hands with the other Arms to obtain by united fire action some common purpose, a balance of judgment and absence of prejudice is implied which is of the rarest occurrence in normal natures.'