Can Austria or Prussia complain of it, as breaking the line of legitimate succession, while acknowledging Michael on the throne of Portugal? Or can Russia, while not only acknowledging Michael, but having her own throne at this moment filled with the younger brother of the family? These are, both, departures from the strict line of legitimate succession adopted by the holy alliance: and if it be sufficient to excuse the departure in these two instances, that the reigning prince is of the same blood with the right heir, the same may be urged for the reigning king of France; for he is a Bourbon in the maternal line. It is not upon the abstract principle of the strict line of legitimate succession that these powers can be expected to unite in a war against France. If they do unite in such a war, it will be to assert the right of a prince to rule despotically, in violation of the social compact which unites him with his people. Is this probable? Let us remember that Alexander of Russia was the chief of the armed negotiators by whom this compact was arranged. That monarch saw the impossibility of maintaining a despotic prince, of the obnoxious house of Bourbon, on the throne of France, in the state of high illumination which then existed among the people. And although the allied armies were in possession of Paris, he would not permit Louis the XVIII. to enter until he had given to his people the charter which they required. Will the present Emperor of Russia support with his arms the violation of the charter thus sanctioned by his august brother? That it has been most shamefully and most unwisely violated, all Europe admits. That the offender has been removed with astonishing moderation and humanity, is equally admitted. That the revolution is not a war upon monarchy is apparent by the fact that a monarch now occupies the throne, and substantially under the charter to which Russia herself gave her sanction in 1814. With what decency, then, could Russia interfere? But, waving the _decorum_ of such an interference, (which perhaps would not be insurmountable,) let us attend to the motives by which princes are more generally governed; the practicability of the enterprize, and the value of its precarious success, compared with the certain costs and hazards of the attempt.