maintaining another at home to keep down the discontents of their own people. Those people are no longer the automatons they were in 1814. They have discovered that they are men as their monarchs are, deriving from the God of nature equal rights, and with a clear right to participate in the government of their choice. Is it credible that they would bear the repeated conscriptions to which such a war would subject them, for the purpose of carrying on a crusade against the liberties of others abroad, and thus riveting, more closely, their own chains at home? If, in spite of all these discouragements, those powers were mad or fatuitous enough to meditate such an enterprise, have they any reason to believe that it could succeed? Must they not see, on the contrary, that it would be utterly hopeless? Have they forgotten that when France stood alone, with all Europe combined against her, they found her invincible; that she swept their embattled hosts from every field, and led her victorious legions into their own capitals? One of these monarchs is reported already to have said that "he has had enough of French wars." Well may he say so; and well may Austria respond "Amen." They have not forgotten that Napoleon twice "struck their crowns into the hazard," and that it was by his gift that they now wear them. And although Napoleon be no more, they well know the gigantic power of France when armed in such a cause, and how readily a war upon her liberties will raise up some other Napoleon, probably from among the heroes of the Polytechnic school, once more to sweep like a whirlwind over their dominions, and to bring them again to his feet. If France, single-handed, was able to do this, while every power in Europe frowned upon her, what will she not be able to accomplish when cheered by the countenance, and perhaps supported by the arms of England? Amid so many discouragements, is it conceivable that these powers will brave the consequences of an enterprise so full of despair? No one believes that their decision will be governed by any other motive than their own interest. Their own safety will be their supreme law. But will not this very consideration conduct them to the conclusion that it is their wisest course to keep the peace with France, and endeavor to preserve peace at home? Can they fail to perceive that the irresistible course of events must constrain them ultimately to make terms with their subjects; and that it is far wiser to make them at once, with as good a grace as remains to them, and to place their governments at least on the basis of the British constitution, of whose stability they have had such signal proof? Must they not see that it is far wiser thus to act, than to peril the consequences of that wild and desolating uproar throughout Europe, which an invasion of France would unquestionably produce?