To speak first of the last-named work, we learn from it, as also from earlier and later minor writings, that in Lombroso’s opinion it is not the internal, inborn factors only that exercise an important influence upon the actions and the social behaviour of human beings. Indeed, to Lombroso as a determinist we owe a service which distinguishes him from the great majority of modern determinists. He was bold enough to revive and to restore to psychology the cosmic determinism of the Pythagoreans. It was not _within_ the organism alone that he sought the determining influences of physiological and psychological activity. He looked for these also _outside_ the organism—in the environment; and his conception of this environment was the very widest possible (see p. 132). At first, when still quite a young man, he laid stress, with Buckle, upon the influence of civilization—that is to say, of the cultural environment—upon individual phenomena. He saw, indeed, in these phenomena, when they are of an abnormal character—taking, for example, the form of insanity, crime, or prostitution—diseases of the social organism, which become individualized in predisposed or malformed persons (the theory of degeneration). Subsequently he came to note, and perhaps to overestimate, the influence of meteorological and cosmic processes—the influence, that is to say, of the physical environment. Later still, when he had grasped the entire plan of the edifice of his life-work, the most important part of that edifice was always the doctrine of causes and of the environment—understanding always by the term “environment” all that comes into relation from outside with the individual and with society, everything competent to determine his tendencies, his gifts, his capacities, and his actions. Lombroso ultimately came to regard environment as profoundly important in determining the production of criminality, as may be seen most clearly in a passage from the fourth chapter of his work on “The Cause and Prevention of Crime,” of which I here give a portion. After a detailed explanation of the distinction between the older civilization, typified by force, and contemporary civilization, typified by cunning, and having shown that both these types are manifested in the criminal career, he goes on to say: “We experience here _de facto_ the parallel activity of two forms of criminality: atavistic criminality, characterized by the relapse of abnormally predisposed individuals to the employment of forcible means in the struggle for existence—means which our own civilization has normally ceased to use—manslaughter, robbery with violence, or rape; and evolutionary criminality, which is just as maleficent in intention, but far more civilized in its means, for in place of force and violence it employs cunning and artifice.”