The first form of criminality is exhibited only by _a comparatively small number of unfortunately predisposed individuals_; the second form, by those who are not sufficiently strong to withstand _the unfavourable influences of their environment_. Thus, following in the tracks of Quetelet, and contemporaneously with Adolf Wagner—the former being the founder of “social physics,” and the latter the man who demonstrated “the reign of law in the apparently voluntary actions of human beings”—Lombroso regarded the activity of the individual as devoid of all true spontaneity. He viewed it in its dependence upon numerous external and internal factors, in part belonging to the organization of the individual and in part to his environment. In accordance with this view, he assigned to the intellect, to “reason,” a minimal share in the control of actions, in the conduct of the _ego_. And even in emotion he saw, for the most part, a simple operation of unconscious processes, subsidiary reactions of the organism in response to natural forces. Thus, in his view, the personality of the doer tended to disappear; individual differences faded away. In his determinism, the idea of the “type,” of the “group,” of the “class,” preponderates. The average man, whose type is deformed by the inexorable law of pathological inheritance (which plays so large a part in all Lombroso’s works), acts under the mechanical compulsion of his internal disposition and organization; and, further, as if this alone were insufficient, he is driven by the external conditions of life, whether those of the physical environment or those of the social organization. Thus he reduces individual differences, for the most part, to a few types, in which the degenerative predispositions almost always manifest themselves in the form of automatic “epileptic” discharges. This does not mean that he altogether denied individual classification, but in his teaching all individuals were contemplated in the light of one and the same fundamental determinism. From the lowest step of this classification occupied by the savage atavistic criminal, the series proceeds to the altitude on which is enthroned the figure of the genius. This determinism, although not expressly stated, underlies also his account of genius. Almost throughout his whole life he was interested in the problem of genius. We see this from his first important work, published in the year 1855, upon the “Insanity of Cardanus.” It runs through the six Italian and eight foreign editions of his work on “The Man of Genius.” We see it also in the last important work published before he died, on “Genius and Degeneration.”