Such a remonstrance, considering the weakness of the government under the old Articles of Confederation, and the exhausted condition immediately following the Revolution, produced a profound sensation in Congress. That body passed an act providing for the negotiation of a treaty or treaties, and making an appropriation for the purchase and extinguishment of the Indian claim to certain lands. These preparations and appropriations resulted in two treaties made at Fort Harmar, January 9, 1789, one with the Six Nations, and the other with the Wiandot, Delaware, Ottawa, Chippewa, Pottawatima, and Sac Nations, wherein the Indian title of occupancy is clearly acknowledged. That the government so understood and recognized this principle as entering into the text of those treaties is evidenced by a communication bearing date June 15, 1789, from General Knox, then Secretary of War, to President Washington, and which was communicated by the latter on the same day to Congress, in which it is declared that-- The Indians, being the prior occupants, possess the right of soil. It cannot be taken from them, unless by their free consent, or by right of conquest in case of a just war. To dispossess them on any other principle would be a gross violation of the fundamental laws of nature, and of that distributive justice which is the glory of a nation. The principle thus outlined and approved by the administration of President Washington, although more than once questioned by interested parties, has almost, if not quite, invariably been sustained by the legal tribunals of the country, at least by the courts of final resort; and the decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States bear consistent testimony to its legal soundness. Several times has this question in different forms appeared before the latter tribunal for adjudication, and in each case has the Indian right been recognized and protected. In 1823, 1831, and 1832, Chief Justice Marshall successively delivered the opinion of the court in important cases involving the Indian status and rights. In the second of these cases (The Cherokee Nation _vs_. The State of Georgia) it was maintained that the Cherokees were a state and had uniformly been treated as such since the settlement of the country; that the numerous treaties made with them by the United States recognized them as a people capable of maintaining the relations of peace and war; of being responsible in their political character for any violation of their engagements, or for any aggression committed on the citizens of the United States by any individual of their community; that the condition of the Indians in their relations to the United States is perhaps unlike that of any other two peoples on the globe; that, in general, nations not owing a common allegiance are foreign to each other, but that the relation of the Indians to the United States is