Chance, Love, and Logic: Philosophical EssaysPeirce, Charles S. (Charles Sanders)
Philosophy
Chance, Love, and Logic: Philosophical Essays
Peirce, Charles S. (Charles Sanders)
Metaphysics; Peirce, Charles S. (Charles Sanders), 1839-1914 -- Bibliography; Pragmatism; Science -- Philosophy
Royce’s indebtedness to Peirce is principally in the use of modern
mathematical material, such as the recent development of the concepts of
infinity and continuity, to throw light on fundamental questions of
philosophy, such as relation of the individual to God or the Universe.
At the end of the nineteenth century mathematics had almost disappeared
from the repertory of philosophy (cf. Külpe’s _Introduction to
Philosophy_), and Peirce’s essay on the _Law of Mind_ opened a new way
which Royce followed in his _World and the Individual_, to the great
surprise of his idealistic brethren. In his _Problem of Christianity_
Royce has also indicated his indebtedness to Peirce for his doctrine of
social consciousness, the mind of the community, and the process of
interpretation. It may be that a great deal of the similarity between
the thoughts of these two men is due to common sources, such as the
works of Kant and Schelling; but it is well to note that not only in his
later writings but also in his lectures and seminars Royce continually
referred to Peirce’s views.
The ground for the neo-realist movement in American philosophy was
largely prepared by the mathematical work of Russell and by the
utilization of mathematics to which Royce was led by Peirce. The logic
of Mr. Russell is based, as he himself has pointed out, on a combination
of the work of Peirce and Peano. In this combination the notation of
Peano has proved of greater technical fluency, but all of Peano’s
results can also be obtained by Peirce’s method as developed by
Schroeder and Mrs. Ladd-Franklin. But philosophically Peirce’s influence
is far greater in insisting that logic is not a branch of psychology,
that it is not concerned with merely mental processes, but with
objective relations. To the view that the laws of logic represent “the
necessities of thought,” that propositions are true because “we can not
help thinking so,” he answers: “Exact logic will say that _C_’s
following logically from _A_ is a state of things which no impotence of
thought alone can bring about.”[21] “The question of validity is purely
one of fact and not of thinking.... It is not in the least the question
whether, when the premises are accepted by the mind, we feel an impulse
to accept the conclusion also. The true conclusion would remain true if
we had no impulse to accept it, and the false one would remain false
though we could not resist the tendency to believe in it.”[22]
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