These articles are by-products or fragments of a comprehensive work on _Logic_ on which Peirce was engaged for many years. For the writing of this book, Royce declared, no greater mind or greater erudition has appeared in America. Only several chapters seem to have been finished, and will doubtless be included with other hitherto unpublished manuscripts in the complete edition of Peirce’s writings that is now being prepared by Harvard University. Footnote 8: Baldwin’s _Dictionary_, article Synechism. Footnote 9: _Ib._ Footnote 10: Baldwin’s _Dictionary_, art. Individual: “Everything whose identity consists in a continuity of reactions will be a single logical individual.” Footnote 11: The personal relations between Peirce and Wright were thus described by Peirce in a letter to Mrs. Ladd-Franklin (_Journal of Philosophy_, Vol. 13, p. 719): “It must have been about 1857 when I first made the acquaintance of Chauncey Wright, a mind about on the level of J. S. Mill. He was a thorough mathematician. He had a most penetrating intellect.—He and I used to have long and very lively and close disputations lasting two or three hours daily for many years. In the sixties I started a little club called ‘The Metaphysical Club.’—Wright was the strongest member and probably I was next.—Then there were Frank Abbott, William James and others.” “It was there that the name and the doctrine of pragmatism saw the light.” It might be added that Peirce’s tychism is indebted to Wright’s doctrine of accidents and “cosmic weather,” a doctrine which maintained against LaPlace that a mind knowing nature from moment to moment is bound to encounter genuine novelty in phenomena, which no amount of knowledge would enable us to foresee. See Wright’s _Philosophical Discussions_—1876, also Cambridge _Hist. of American Literature_, Vol. 3, p. 234. Footnote 12: _Monist_, Vol. 15, p. 180. Footnote 13: This volume, pp. 43-45. Footnote 14: “To say that we live for the sake of action would be to say that there is no such thing as a rational purport.” _Monist_, Vol. XV, p. 175. Footnote 15: The letter to Mrs. Ladd-Franklin quoted before, explains why James, though always loyal to Peirce and anxious to give him credit whenever possible, could not understand the latter’s lectures on pragmatism. Peirce’s incidental judgments on others is worth quoting here: