Chance, Love, and Logic: Philosophical EssaysPeirce, Charles S. (Charles Sanders)
Philosophy
Chance, Love, and Logic: Philosophical Essays
Peirce, Charles S. (Charles Sanders)
Metaphysics; Peirce, Charles S. (Charles Sanders), 1839-1914 -- Bibliography; Pragmatism; Science -- Philosophy
The Darwinian controversy is, in large part, a question of logic. Mr.
Darwin proposed to apply the statistical method to biology. The same
thing has been done in a widely different branch of science, the theory
of gases. Though unable to say what the movement of any particular
molecule of gas would be on a certain hypothesis regarding the
constitution of this class of bodies, Clausius and Maxwell were yet
able, by the application of the doctrine of probabilities, to predict
that in the long run such and such a proportion of the molecules would,
under given circumstances, acquire such and such velocities; that there
would take place, every second, such and such a number of collisions,
etc.; and from these propositions they were able to deduce certain
properties of gases, especially in regard to their heat-relations. In
like manner, Darwin, while unable to say what the operation of variation
and natural selection in every individual case will be, demonstrates
that in the long run they will adapt animals to their circumstances.
Whether or not existing animal forms are due to such action, or what
position the theory ought to take, forms the subject of a discussion in
which questions of fact and questions of logic are curiously interlaced.
II
The object of reasoning is to find out, from the consideration of what
we already know, something else which we do not know. Consequently,
reasoning is good if it be such as to give a true conclusion from true
premises, and not otherwise. Thus, the question of validity is purely
one of fact and not of thinking. A being the premises and B being the
conclusion, the question is, whether these facts are really so related
that if A is B is. If so, the inference is valid; if not, not. It is not
in the least the question whether, when the premises are accepted by the
mind, we feel an impulse to accept the conclusion also. It is true that
we do generally reason correctly by nature. But that is an accident; the
true conclusion would remain true if we had no impulse to accept it; and
the false one would remain false, though we could not resist the
tendency to believe in it.
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