3. It was also declared by defendants that the Act of 1864 had been misconstrued—that it did not relieve San Francisco from her subscription, but simply authorized the city to liquidate that subscription “in cash or other security” instead of in bonds. “We claim,” said counsel, “that the act authorized no more than the reduction of the amount of subscription and a change of the mode of payment to cash or other security in place of bonds. It does not authorize a donation of $400,000 or any other amount. In other words, it authorizes a subscription for any amount less than $600,000, payable in cash in place of bonds.”[59] One has the feeling that at this stage of the proceedings, the first and third of these propositions were not well taken. It was too plainly the intention of the legislature to allow the city of San Francisco to withdraw from its subscription for a consideration, to permit weight to be given to technical points like these. On the other hand, it is very doubtful if the railroad had at this time either called in from other subscribers the whole amount of their respective subscriptions, or had expended on the road from other sources a sum equal to the amount of the bonds. The Supreme Court, however, did not make even this concession, but promptly issued a mandamus against Coon, Hale, and Paxon, commanding and requiring them to execute and deliver without delay, to the Central Pacific Railroad of California, the 400 bonds of the city and county of San Francisco, described in the ordinance before referred to.[60] Further Litigation