Now, although the Common Law may not be approached as a source of jurisdiction under the National Constitution,--and on this interesting topic I forbear to dwell,--_it is clear that it may be employed to determine the meaning of technical terms in the Constitution borrowed from this law_. This, indeed, is expressly sanctioned by Mr. Madison, in his celebrated Report of 1799, while limiting the extent to which the Common Law may be employed. Thus by this law we learn the nature of _Trial by Jury_, which, though secured, is not described by the Constitution; also what are _Attainder_, _Habeas Corpus_, and _Impeachment_, all technical terms of the Constitution, borrowed from the Common Law. By this law, and its associate Chancery, we learn what are _cases in law and equity_ to which the judicial power of the United States is extended. These instances I adduce merely for example. Also in the same way we learn what are _suits at Common Law_. Now, on principle and authority, _a claim for the delivery of a fugitive slave is a suit at Common Law_, and is embraced naturally and necessarily in this class of judicial proceedings. This proposition can be placed beyond question. And here, especially, let me ask the attention of all learned in the law. On this point, as on every other in this argument, I challenge inquiry and answer. History painfully records, that, during the early days of the Common Law, and down even to a late period, a system of Slavery existed in England, known under the name of _villenage_. The slave was generally called a _villein_, though in the original Latin forms of judicial proceedings he was termed _nativus_, implying slavery by birth. The incidents of this condition are minutely described, and also the mutual remedies of master and slave, all of which were regulated by the Common Law. Slaves sometimes then, as now, _escaped_ from their masters. The claim for them, after such _escape_, was prosecuted by a "suit at Common Law," to which, as to every suit at Common Law, Trial by Jury was necessarily attached. Blackstone, in his Commentaries, in words which must have been known to all the lawyers of the Convention, said of _villeins_: "They could not leave their lord without his permission; _but if they ran away_, or were purloined from him, _might be CLAIMED and recovered by ACTION, like beasts or other chattels_."[175] This very word, "action," of itself implies "a suit at Common Law" with Trial by Jury. [175] Commentaries, Vol. II. p. 93. From other sources we learn precisely what the _action_ was. That great expounder of the ancient law, Mr. Hargrave, says, "Our Year Books and Books of Entries are full of the forms used in pleading a title to villeins regardant."[176] Though no longer of practical value in England, they remain as monuments of jurisprudence, and as mementos of a barbarous institution. He thus describes the remedy of the master at Common Law.