I fear that they are more than impolitic. I will not argue here the question of Constitutional Law; but I appeal to the better judgment of my professional brethren--and I am happy to see some of them lingering at this late hour--that any attempt on the part of the State to interfere, in any way, by addition or subtraction, with the organization of the national militia, is an experiment which we should not introduce into the permanent text of our organic law. If the decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States on the powers of Congress are to prevail, then, it seems to me, any such assumption, in a case where the original power of Congress is clear, will be unconstitutional and void. In the famous case of _Prigg_ v. _Pennsylvania_, after an elaborate discussion at the bar, all State legislation on the subject of fugitive slaves was declared unconstitutional and void, while Congress is recognized as the sole depository of power on this subject. According to my recollection, it was expressly held that legislation by Congress excluded all State legislation on the same subject, whether to control, qualify, or _superadd_ to the remedy enacted by Congress. I commend gentlemen, now so swift with these provisions, to the study of this precedent. It is comparatively recent; and the principle of interpretation which it establishes is applicable to State laws on the militia, even though entirely inapplicable to State laws on fugitive slaves,--for the simple reason, that in the former case the original power of Congress is clear, while in the latter it is denied. But the States are not without power over the militia. In the very grant to Congress is a reservation to them as follows: "reserving to the States respectively the appointment of the officers, and the authority of training the militia according to the discipline prescribed by Congress." And here is precisely what the States can do. They may appoint the officers and train the militia. Now, Sir, the first two resolutions before us transcend the powers of the State. They touch the enrolment and organization of the militia, and on this account are an assumption of power forbidden by the principle to which I have referred. The other thirteen resolutions, with the exception of the seventh, are in the nature of a military code, concerning the choice of officers, all of which should be left to the action of the Legislature. In conformity with these views, Mr. Chairman, and in the hope of presenting a proposition on which the Convention may unite, I propose to strike out all after the preamble and insert two resolutions, as follows. ART. 1. The Governor shall be the Commander-in-Chief of the Army and Navy of the State, and the Militia thereof, excepting when these forces shall be actually in the service of the United States,--and shall have power to call out the same to aid in the execution of the laws, to suppress insurrection, and to repel invasion.