An attempt has been made to render this system odious, or at least questionable, by charging upon it something of the excesses of the great French Revolution. Even if this rule had prevailed at that time in France, it would be bold to charge upon it any such consequences. But it is a mistake to suppose that it was then adopted in that country. The republican Constitution of 1791 was not founded upon numbers only, but upon numbers, territory, and taxation combined,--a mixed system, which excluded the true idea of personal equality. At the peaceful, almost bloodless, Revolution of 1848, under the lead of Lamartine, a National Assembly was convened on the simple basis of population, and one representative was allowed for every forty thousand inhabitants. Here, indeed, is the Rule of Three; but the idea originally came from our country. MR. HALLETT. Will the gentleman for Marshfield allow me to make one more inquiry? MR. SUMNER. Certainly. MR. HALLETT. Do I understand the gentleman to say that the Rule of Three was applied to representation in the United States? MR. SUMNER. I mean to say that the representation in the lower House of Congress was apportioned according to numbers; and this is the Rule of Three. A practical question arises here, whether this rule should be applied to the whole body of population, including women, children, and unnaturalized foreigners, or to those only who exercise the electoral franchise,--in other words, to voters. It is probable that the rule would produce nearly similar results in both cases, as voters, except in few places, would bear a uniform proportion to the whole population. But it is easy to determine what the principle of the Representative System requires. Since its object is to provide a practical substitute for meetings of the people, it should be founded, in just proportion, on the numbers of those who, according to our Constitution, can take part in those meetings,--that is, upon the qualified voters. The representative body should be a miniature or abridgment of the electoral body,--in other words, of those allowed to participate in public affairs. If this conclusion needs authority, it may be found in the words of Mr. Madison, in the Debates on the National Constitution. "It has been very properly observed," he says, "that representation is an expedient by which the meeting of the people themselves is rendered unnecessary, _and that_ _the representatives ought, therefore, to bear a proportion to the votes which their constituents, if convened, would respectively have_."[18] [18] Madison's Debates, July 14, 1787, Vol. II. p. 1102.