This treaty may be terminated on notice from “either of the contracting parties.” In other treaties, having a similar provision, other equivalent terms are employed: as in the treaty with Greece in 1837, and with Sardinia in 1838, where the term “high contracting parties” is employed; the treaty with Hanover in 1840, and with the Hanseatic Republics in 1852, where the term “Government of the United States on the one part” is employed; and, again, in the treaty with New Granada in 1844, where the term “one of the two Governments” is employed. These terms are all identical in meaning; and they signify that the notice in all cases must be _an act of the Government_. Who, then, for this purpose, is the Government, under the Constitution of the United States? Surely, the power that can abrogate a treaty, and nothing short of this; and this power, we have already seen, is represented by an Act of Congress alone. The Committee in their report, undertake to set forth the difference between treaties which contain no provision for their termination and those which do contain such provision, as follows. “The distinction in the character of the acts, in the one class of treaties and in the other, consists in this: that in the first class, as in the treaties with France in 1798, they were annulled as to the other party, _se invito_; in the second, in the case with England, they became null with the assent of that power previously given.” Permit me to say that this does not seem to be a correct statement of the difference between the two classes; for in both cases the treaties were annulled contrary to the desire of the opposite party; and it is notorious that the pending proceedings to annul the treaty with Denmark are contrary to the desire of that power. No, Sir: the difference between the two cases must be found in something else, which seems to me palpable and unmistakable. It is this. By the Law of Nations, in the absence of any express stipulation, a treaty is of perpetual obligation on both parties,--to be abrogated only by a new treaty having the assent of both parties, or by the act of one party, alleging bad faith or hostile intent in the other, and on this account declaring before the civilized world a release from all its obligations. Such an act not only operates upon the other party _in invitum_, but it is also _offensive in character_. But if any express stipulation is introduced, authorizing the termination of the treaty on notice from either party, then it may be abrogated in conformity to the stipulation, even contrary to the desire of the opposite party, _without giving cause of offence_; and this will be found to be the sole practical distinction between the two cases. In both, the same _power_ must be invoked; but it acts in different ways.