Discarding now all presumptuous boasts for Slavery, and bearing in mind its essential Barbarism, I come to consider that second assumption of Senators on the other side, which is, of course, inspired by the first, even if not its immediate consequence, that, under the Constitution, Slave-Masters may take their slaves into the National Territories, and there continue to hold them, as at home in the Slave States,--and that this would be the case in any territory newly acquired, by purchase or by war, as of Mexico on the South or Canada on the North. Here I begin with the remark, that, as the assumption of Constitutional Law is inspired by the assumption of fact with regard to the “ennobling” character of Slavery, so it must lose much, if not all of its force, when the latter assumption is shown to be false, as has been done to-day. When Slavery is seen to be the Barbarism which it is, there are few who would not cover it from sight, rather than insist upon sending it abroad with the flag of the Republic. Only because people have been insensible to its true character have they tolerated for a moment its exorbitant pretensions. Therefore this long exposition, where Slavery stands forth in fivefold Barbarism, with the single object of compelling men to work without wages, naturally prepares the way to consider the assumption of Constitutional Law. This assumption may be described as an attempt to _Africanize_ the Constitution, by introducing into it the barbarous Law of Slavery, originally derived, as we have seen, from barbarous Africa,--and then, through such _Africanization_ of the Constitution, to _Africanize_ the Territories, and _Africanize_ the National Government. In using this language to express the obvious effect of this assumption, I borrow a suggestive term, first employed by a Portuguese writer at the beginning of this century, when protesting against the spread of Slavery in Brazil.[124] Analyze the assumption, and it is found to stand on two pretensions, either of which failing, the assumption fails also. These two are, first, the peculiar African pretension of property in man,--and, secondly, the pretension that such property is recognized in the Constitution. With regard to the first of these pretensions, I might simply refer to what has been said at an earlier stage of this argument. But I should do injustice to the part it plays in this controversy, if I did not again notice it. Then I sought particularly to show its Barbarism; now I shall show something more.