Pardon me, if I say that such a question cannot at any time be trivial. But it has an unaccustomed magnitude on this occasion, because the case is novel in this body; so that what you now do, besides involving the liberty of the gentleman at the bar, will establish a precedent, which, in itself, will be a law for other cases hereafter. Now, if it be conceded that the Senate is invested with all the large powers claimed by the Houses of Parliament, then I cannot doubt its power in the present case, although I might well question the expediency of exercising it. But this is notoriously untrue. It is well known that Parliament is above the constraint of a written Constitution; and it has been more than once declared--much to the indignation of our Revolutionary fathers--that it is “omnipotent” to such extent that it can do anything it pleases, except make a man of a woman, or a woman of a man. The Senate has no such large powers; it is not “omnipotent,” but under the constraint of a written Constitution. Instead of authority in all possible cases, it has authority only in certain specific cases. If the Senate can summon witnesses to its bar, and compel them to testify, under pains and penalties, it must be by virtue of powers delegated in the Constitution,--I do not say by express grant, but at least by positive intendment. I say positive intendment; for nothing is to be presumed against liberty. There are certain cases in which the power is clear: first, and most conspicuously, in the trial of impeachments; secondly, in determining the elections, returns, and qualifications of its members; and, thirdly, in punishing its members for disorderly behavior. All these proceedings are judicial, as well as political, in character, and carry with them, as a natural incident, the power to compel witnesses to testify. Beyond these three cases, which stand on the express words of the Constitution, there are two other cases, quasi-judicial in character, which, though not supported by express words of the Constitution, have grown out of necessity and reason, amounting to positive intendment, and are sanctioned by precedents. I refer, first, to the inquiry into an alleged violation of the privileges of this body, as where a copy of a treaty was furtively obtained and published; and, secondly, to the inquiry into conduct of servants of the Senate, like that now proceeding with regard to the Printer, on the motion of the Senator from New York [Mr. KING]. If I were asked to indicate the principle on which these two cases stood, I should say it was that just and universal right of _self-defence_ inherent in every parliamentary body, as in every court, and also in every individual, but which is limited closely by the simple necessities of the case.