At that moment the American Republic was straining every nerve to suppress a Rebellion whose single declared object was the foundation of a new government with Slavery as its corner-stone. War by England was practical recognition of the new government, with alliance and breaking of the blockade. The difficulty in comprehending this attitude is increased, when it is known that the British Government did not regard the seizure as authorized by instructions. In his letter to Lord Lyons, Earl Russell says expressly: “Her Majesty’s Government are willing to believe that the United States naval officer who committed the aggression was not acting in compliance with any authority from his Government.”[17] Therefore the National Government had done nothing,--absolutely nothing. On the same day that Earl Russell indited his remarkable despatch, Mr. Seward wrote from Washington to Mr. Adams, at London, on business of the legation, and in his letter mentions that Captain Wilkes “acted without any instructions from the Government.” He adds: “We have done nothing on the subject to anticipate the discussion.” The letter throughout is in the spirit of peace. After declaring his inference “that the British Government is now awake to the importance of averting possible conflict, and disposed to confer and act with earnestness to that end,” Mr. Seward says, “If so, we are disposed to meet them in the same spirit, as a nation chiefly of British lineage, sentiments, and sympathies, a civilized and humane nation, a Christian people,” and then adds, that the affair of the Trent “is to be met and disposed of by the two Governments, if possible, in the spirit to which I have adverted,”[18] that is, with a sense of “the importance of averting possible conflict,” and a disposition “to confer and act with earnestness to that end,” as a Christian people. It so happened that Mr. Adams read this letter to Earl Russell on the very day that Lord Lyons read the demand for surrender and apology to Mr. Seward; but the British Government did not allow its pacific contents to become known, and the war-fever went on. Here Mr. Dana aptly remarks: “The truth seems to be, that, so long as they were uncertain whether their menace of war might not lead to war, they could not afford to withdraw the chief motive for the war-spirit in the British people, and to admit that their warlike demonstration had been needless. Their popular support depended upon a general belief in a necessity for their having accompanied their demand with the preparations and menace of war.”[19]