Remember, Sir, that the question in this controversy is _strictly a question of law_,--precisely like a question of trespass between two neighbors. The British Cabinet began proceedings by taking the opinion of their law advisers, precisely as an individual begins proceedings in a suit at law by taking the opinion of his attorney. To make such a question _a case of war_, or to suggest that war is a proper mode of deciding it, is simply to revive, on a gigantic scale, the exploded Ordeal by Battle, and to imitate those dark ages when such proceeding was openly declared to be the best and most honorable mode of deciding even an abstract point of law. “It was a matter of doubt and dispute,” says a mediæval historian, “whether the sons of a son ought to be reckoned among the children of the family, and succeed equally with their uncles, if their father happened to die while their grandfather was alive. An assembly was called to deliberate on this point, and it was the general opinion that it ought to be remitted to the examination and decision of judges. But the Emperor, following a better course, and desirous of dealing honorably with his people and nobles, appointed the matter to be decided by battle between two champions.”[38] In similar spirit has it been latterly proposed, amidst the amazement of the civilized world, to withdraw the point of law, now raised by Great Britain, from peaceful adjudication, and submit it to Trial by Combat. The irrational anachronism becomes more flagrant from the inconsistency of the party making it; for it cannot be forgotten, that, in times past, _on this identical point of law_, Great Britain persistently held an opposite ground from that she now takes. Hereafter, in a happier moment, this exacting power may regret the swiftness with which she undertook to gird herself for unnatural combat, on a mere point of law, with a friendly nation already struggling against domestic enemies,--especially as impartial history must record that her heavy sword was to be thrown into the scale of Slavery. * * * * * The British complaint seems narrowed to a single point, although there are yet other points, on which, had the ship been carried into port for adjudication, controversy must have arisen. The four following have been presented in the case. 1. That the seizure of the Rebel emissaries, without taking the ship into port, was wrong, _inasmuch as a navy officer is not entitled to substitute himself for a judicial tribunal_. 2. That, had the ship been carried into port, it would not have been liable on account of the Rebel emissaries, inasmuch as neutral ships are free to carry all persons not apparently in the military or naval service of the enemy. 3. Are despatches contraband of war, so as to render the ship liable to seizure? 4. Are neutral ships, carrying despatches, liable to be stopped between two neutral ports?