The persons arrayed for the overthrow of the Government of the United States are unquestionably _criminals_, subject to all the penalties of rebellion, which is of course treason under the Constitution of the United States. The same persons arrayed in war against the Government of the United States are unquestionably _enemies_, exposed to all the incidents of war, with its penalties, seizures, contributions, confiscations, captures, and prizes. They are _criminals_, because they set themselves traitorously against the Government of their country. They are _enemies_, because their combination assumes the front and proportions of war. It is idle to say that they are not criminals. It is idle to say that they are not enemies. They are both, and they are either; and it is for the Government of the United States to proceed against them in either character, according to controlling considerations of policy. This right is so obvious, on grounds of reason, that it seems superfluous to sustain it by authority. But since its recognition is essential to the complete comprehension of our present position, I shall not hesitate to illustrate it by judicial decisions, and also by an earlier voice. A judgment of the Supreme Court of the United States cannot bind the Senate on this question; but it is an important guide, to which we all bow with respect. In the best days of this eminent tribunal, when Marshall was Chief Justice, in a case arising out of the efforts of France to suppress insurrection in the colony of San Domingo, it was affirmed by the Court that in such a case there were two distinct sources of power open to exercise by a government,--one found in the rights of a sovereign, the other in the rights of a belligerent, or, in other words, one under Municipal Law, and the other under International Law,--and the exercise of one did not prevent the exercise of the other. Belligerent rights, it was admitted, might be superadded to the rights of sovereignty. Here are the actual words of Chief-Justice Marshall:-- “It is not intended to say that belligerent rights may not be superadded to those of sovereignty. But admitting a sovereign, who is endeavoring to reduce his revolted subjects to obedience, to possess both sovereign and belligerent rights, and to be capable of acting in either character, the manner in which he acts must determine the character of the act. If as a legislator he publishes a law ordaining punishments for certain offences, which law is to be applied by courts, the nature of the law and of the proceedings under it will decide whether it is an exercise of belligerent rights or exclusively of his sovereign power.”[9] Here are the words of another eminent judge, Mr. Justice Johnson, in the same case:--