Obviously recognizing this principle, which is so entirely consistent with reason and that wisdom which is the strength of nations, our country thus far in its history has declined to pass any general prospective law authorizing letters of marque. This is our traditional policy, which the Senator seeks to overturn. The statute authorizing letters of marque in 1812 expired with the war. It was not general or prospective. Is there any reason now that we should depart from this policy? Is there any good to be accomplished by such departure? It is strange that at this moment, when other nations renounce privateering, we should rush forward and ostentatiously declare it part of our political system,--I might almost say, an element of our political life. Pray, if this declaration were of such importance, why has it been so long postponed? Generations, jealous guardians of all our national rights, have passed away, leaving the statute-book without any such voice. It did not occur to them that the national defence or the national honor required it. And yet the discovery is suddenly made that this is a mistake, or that our predecessors were all wrong, especially in not announcing to the world that in the event of war privateers will be let loose. As there is no foreign war in which we are now engaged, this provision is prospective and minatory, so far as foreign nations are concerned. It is notice to avoid any question with us, under penalty of depredations by privateers. If not a menace, it is very like one. I do not know that it will be so interpreted by those to whom it is addressed, but I am sure that it can do no good; and just in proportion as it is so interpreted, it will be worse than useless. A menace is as ill-timed between nations as between individuals. I do not dwell now on the irrational character of privateering, but I seize the occasion to declare my deliberate judgment that our country may yet find, to its cost, that this cherished weapon is a two-edged sword. A nation with an extensive commerce cannot afford to invite the hazard of its employment. Thus, in the event of war with a power inferior to ourselves in commerce, as Portugal, or Spain, or France, the increased rates of insurance would make it impossible for us to keep our ships afloat, while all our profits on the ocean would be appropriated by those nations happily still at peace. The very superiority of our commerce would be a disadvantage, inasmuch as we should be more exposed. For instance, in a war with Portugal or Spain we should stake gold against copper, and even in a war with France it would be gold against silver. If this prospect pleases, then Senators will vote for a measure which may be called _Privateering made easy; or, how to do it without Congress_.