At this moment our domestic relations all hinge upon one question,--How to treat the Rebel States. No patriot citizen doubts the triumph of our arms in the suppression of the Rebellion. Early or late triumph is inevitable,--perhaps by sudden collapse of the bloody imposture, or perhaps by slower and more gradual surrender. For ourselves, we are prepared for either alternative, and shall not be disappointed, if constrained to wait yet a little longer; but when the day of triumph comes, political duties will take the place of military. The victory won by our soldiers must be assured by wise counsels, so that its hard-earned fruits shall not be lost. The relations of the States to the National Government must be carefully considered,--not too boldly, not too timidly,--that we may understand in what way or by what process _the transition from Rebel forms may be most surely accomplished_. If I do not greatly err, it will be found that the powers of Congress, thus far so effective in raising armies and supplying moneys, will be important, if not essential, in fixing the conditions of perpetual peace. But there is one point on which there can be no question. The dogma and delusion of State Rights, as mischievously interpreted, which did so much for the Rebellion, must not be allowed to neutralize all that our arms have gained. Already, in a remarkable instance, the President has treated the pretension of State Rights with proper indifference. Quietly and without much discussion, he has constituted military governments in the Rebel States, with governors nominated by himself: all of which testifies against the old delusion. Strange will it be, if this extraordinary power, amply conceded to the President, is denied to Congress. Practically, the whole question is opened here. Therefore to this aspect of it I ask your first attention.