But whatever the signification of this word in the Constitution, even conceding all that is claimed for it there, the instance is entirely inapplicable to the interpretation of the statute in question. If there be doubt on the Constitution, there is none on the statute. The latter is plain, and there are no associate words to interfere with its natural and unequivocal signification. I conclude this branch of the subject as I began, by putting aside all irrelevant matter, all superfluous questions, all surplusage, all topics not properly germane to the debate. There is no question of the Constitution, no question of _ex post facto_, but a simple question on the meaning of a statute. The oath is prescribed by Congress. It is too late to debate its constitutionality thus incidentally. It only remains for us to take it, promptly, patriotically. The procrastination of this debate is of evil example. How can we expect the alacrity of loyalty among the people, if the Senate hesitates? * * * * * Another objection to the proposed rule has been brought forward by the Senator from Vermont [Mr. FOOT]. According to him, the statute is obligatory, and the oath must be taken by Senators, but a rule requiring the oath is superfluous and without precedent. The argument of the Senator is plausible, but it is answered by a simple statement of facts, in which, as presiding officer of the Senate, he bore a conspicuous part. From this statement it will appear that the rule, or some equivalent action of the Senate, is not superfluous. Here Mr. Sumner set forth the facts substantially as presented in the Introduction, showing the necessity of the proposed rule, and then proceeded. The language of the Chair, when inviting Senators to take the oath, left a loophole through which they might avoid the oath. It was, “Such Senators present _as choose to do so_ will come forward,” and then “they will have _an opportunity to subscribe the oath_.” In such terms Senators were invited to do as they pleased, thus making a discrimination between the earlier oath, which they were obliged to take in order to be qualified, and the additional oath, which they were free to neglect. Such is a plain statement of facts, which I make in no spirit of personal criticism, but simply that you may see the occasion for the proposed rule. Had the Chair at the beginning proceeded to administer the additional oath, as the earlier oath, there would have been no occasion for a rule. Or had the Chair afterwards, when attention was called to the omission, administered the additional oath according to the requirement of the statute, there would have been no occasion for a rule.