But how estimate the value of release from the “guaranty” retrospectively and prospectively, as well for past failures as future liabilities? It was often urged that the guaranty bound the United States to the support of France only in the event of a defensive war, and that the war in which she had been engaged was not of this character. But it is more than doubtful if either proposition can be maintained. The guaranty on its face has no limitation. And even if it had such limitation, who will venture to say that the war in which France drove back her multitudinous assailants, reinforced by the navies of England, was not defensive? If France did not at once require the execution of the guaranty, it was none the less a vital obligation. That our Government appreciated the embarrassments, if not the obligations, which the guaranty entailed, has already been shown by the Committee. But there are certain words that may be fitly quoted again. In the instructions of our Secretary of State to the first triumvirate of plenipotentiaries at Paris, under date of July 15, 1797, it is admitted that “our guaranty of the possessions of France in America will perpetually expose us to the risk and expense of war, or to disputes and questions concerning our national faith.” On this account the plenipotentiaries were instructed to obtain its release, and “on the part of the United States, instead of troops or ships of war, to stipulate for a moderate sum of money or quantity of provisions, at the option of France, … not to exceed two hundred thousand dollars a year.”[251] This was moderate; but it was a recognition of the guaranty, and of its practical value. The next triumvirate, at the negotiation of 1800, offered more. They proposed to buy out the guaranty by a payment of five millions of francs, or one million of dollars.[252] It is needless to say that both these offers were rejected. It would be as difficult to measure in money the value of that guaranty, retrospectively and prospectively, as to measure in money our obligations to France in the assurance of national independence. The liabilities for failure prior to 1800, if pressed, would not have been inconsiderable. But had the guaranty continued so as to constrain the United States throughout the long war that followed, ending at Waterloo, what arithmetic can calculate the damage? Nay, more,--if, at the present moment, any such guaranty bound us to France, who would not feel that it was an obligation from which we must be released at any price?