I am not able to say when the idea of this cession first took shape. I have heard that it was as long ago as the Administration of Mr. Polk. It is within my knowledge that the Russian Government was sounded on the subject during the Administration of Mr. Buchanan. This was done through Mr. Gwin, at the time Senator of California, and Mr. Appleton, Assistant Secretary of State. For this purpose the former had more than one interview with the Russian minister at Washington, some time in December, 1859, in which, while professing to speak for the President unofficially, he represented that “Russia was too far off to make the most of these possessions, and that, as we were near, we could derive more from them.” In reply to an inquiry of the Russian minister, Mr. Gwin said that “the United States could go as high as $5,000,000 for the purchase,” on which the former made no comment. Mr. Appleton, on another occasion, said to the minister that “the President thought the acquisition would be very profitable to the States on the Pacific; that he was ready to follow it up, but wished to know in advance if Russia was ready to cede; that, if she were, he would confer with his Cabinet and influential members of Congress.” All this was unofficial; but it was promptly communicated to the Russian Government, who seem to have taken it into careful consideration. Prince Gortchakoff, in a despatch which reached here early in the summer of 1860, said that “the offer was not what might have been expected, but that it merited mature reflection; that the Minister of Finance was about to inquire into the condition of these possessions, after which Russia would be in a condition to treat.” The Prince added for himself, that “he was by no means satisfied personally that it would be for the interest of Russia politically to alienate these possessions; that the only consideration which could make the scales incline that way would be the prospect of great financial advantages, but that the sum of $5,000,000 did not seem in any way to represent the real value of these possessions”; and he concluded by asking the minister to tell Mr. Appleton and Senator Gwin that the sum offered was not considered “an equitable equivalent.” The subject was submerged by the Presidential election which was approaching, and then by the Rebellion. It will be observed that this attempt was at a time when politicians who believed in the perpetuity of Slavery still had power. Mr. Buchanan was President, and he employed as his intermediary a known sympathizer with Slavery, who shortly afterwards became a Rebel. Had Russia been willing, it is doubtful if this controlling interest would have sanctioned any acquisition too far north for Slavery.