Positive acts occurred to strengthen these relations. As early as 1861, the two Governments agreed to act together for the establishment of a connection between San Francisco and St. Petersburg by an inter-oceanic telegraph across Behring Strait; and this agreement was subsequently sanctioned by Congress.[28] Meanwhile occurred the visit of the Russian fleet in the winter of 1863, intended by the Emperor, and accepted by the United States, as a friendly demonstration. This was followed by a communication of the Secretary of State, dated 26th December, 1864, inviting the Archduke Constantine to visit the United States, where it was suggested that such a visit “would be beneficial to us and by no means unprofitable to Russia,” but “forbearing to specify reasons,” and assuring him, that, coming as a national guest, he “would receive a cordial and most demonstrative welcome.”[29] Affairs in Russia prevented the acceptance of this invitation. Afterwards, in the spring of 1866, Congress by solemn resolution declared the sympathies of the United States with the Emperor on his escape from the madness of an assassin,[30] and Mr. Fox, at the time Assistant Secretary of the Navy, was appointed to take the resolution of Congress to the Emperor, and, in discharge of this trust, to declare the friendly sentiments of our country for Russia. He was conveyed to Cronstadt in the monitor Miantonomoh, the most formidable ship of our navy, and thus this agent of war became a messenger of peace. The monitor and the minister were received in Russia with unbounded hospitality. In relations such as I have described, the cession of territory seems a natural transaction, entirely in harmony with the past. It remains to hope that it may be a new link in an amity which, without effort, has overcome differences of institutions and intervening space on the globe. SHALL THE TREATY BE RATIFIED? Such are obvious considerations of a general character. The interests of the Pacific States, the extension of the national domain, the extension of republican institutions, the foreclosure of adverse British possession, and the amity of Russia,--these are the points we have passed in review. Most of these, if not all, are calculated to impress the public mind; but I can readily understand a difference of opinion with regard to the urgency of negotiation at this hour. Some may think that the purchase-money and the annual outlay that must follow might have been postponed another decade, while Russia continued in possession as trustee for our benefit; and yet some of the reasons for the treaty do not seem to allow delay.