Thus does it appear, that, while Mr. Stanton was removed in violation of the Tenure-of-Office Act, Adjutant-General Thomas was appointed Secretary of War _ad interim_ in equal derogation of the Acts of Congress regulating the subject. REMOVAL AND SUBSTITUTION AD INTERIM A VIOLATION OF THE CONSTITUTION. It remains to consider if the removal and substitution were not each in violation of the National Constitution. The case is new, for never until now could it arise. Assuming that the Tenure-of-Office Act does not protect Mr. Stanton, who is thus left afloat in the limbo between the body of the Act and the proviso, then the President is remitted to his prerogative under the National Constitution, and he must be judged accordingly, independently of statute. Finding the power of removal there, he may be justified; but not finding it there, he must bear the consequences. And here the Tenure-of-Office Act furnishes a living and practical construction of the National Constitution from which there is no appeal. From the Constitution it appears that the power of appointment is vested in the President and Senate conjointly, and that nothing is said of the power of removal, except in case of impeachment, when it is made by the Senate. Therefore the power of removal is not express, but implied only, and must exist, if at all, as a necessary consequence of the power to appoint. But in whom? According to a familiar rule, the power which makes can unmake. Unless this rule be rejected, the power of removal must exist in the President and Senate conjointly; nor is there anything unreasonable in this conclusion. Removal can always be effected during the session of the Senate by the nomination and confirmation of a successor, while provision can be made for the recess by an Act of Congress. This conclusion would be irresistible, were the Senate always in session; but since it is not, and since cases may arise during the recess requiring the immediate exercise of this power, it has been argued that at least during the recess it must be in the President alone. From this position there has been a jump to the next, and it has been insisted, that, since, for the sake of public convenience, the power of removal exists in the President, he is at liberty to exercise it either during the recess or the session itself. Here is an obvious extension of the conclusion, which the premises do not warrant. The reason failing, the conclusion must fail. _Cessante ratione legis, cessat ipsa lex._ Especially must this be the case under the National Constitution. A power founded on implied necessity must fail when the necessity does not exist. The implication cannot be carried beyond the reason. Therefore the power of removal during the recess, doubtful at best, unless sanctioned by Act of Congress, cannot be extended to justify the exercise of that power while the Senate is in session, ready to act conjointly with the President.