“All persons residing within this territory, whose property may be used to increase the revenues of the hostile power, are in this contest liable to be treated as enemies, though not foreigners.”[12] Here is the rule of International Law applied directly to our civil war. In a later case the rule is applied with added emphasis and particularity:-- “We must be governed by the principle of public law, so often announced from this bench as applicable alike to civil and international wars, that _all the people of each State or district in insurrection against the United States must be regarded as enemies_.”[13] Thus, according to our highest tribunal, the rule in civil war and international war is the same. By another decision of the Court, this same rule continues in force until the character of public enemy is removed by competent authority. On this point the Court declares itself as follows, in the Alexander cotton case:-- “All the people of each State or district in insurrection against the United States must be regarded as enemies, until, by the action of the Legislature and the Executive, or otherwise, that relation is thoroughly and permanently changed.”[14] If the present case is to be settled by authority, this is enough. Here is the Supreme Court solemnly recognizing the rule of International Law, even to the extent of embracing under its penalties _all the people_ of the hostile community, without regard to their sentiments of loyalty. This is decisive. You cannot decree the national liability in the present case without reversing these decisions. You must declare that the rule of International Law is not applicable to our civil war. There is no ground for exception. You must reject the rule absolutely. Do you say that its application is harsh? Of course it is. But again I say, this is war; or rather, it is rebellion which has assumed the front of war. I do not make the rule. I have nothing to do with it. I take it as I find it, affirmed by great authorities of International Law, and reaffirmed by the Supreme Court of the United States. * * * * * Here I might stop; for the conclusion stands on reason and authority, each unanswerable; but I proceed further in order to relieve the case of all ambiguity. Of course instances may be adduced where compensation has been made to sufferers from an army, but no case like the present. If we glance at these instances, we shall see the wide difference. * * * * *