We are reminded that these banks have secured certain privileges, and it is said often that those are vested, and the old phrase “vested rights” has been repeated. But how can they have vested rights under a statute which contains the provision just read to us, securing to Congress full power to change it in every respect? What, then, is the simple aspect of this question? It is that certain securities have been lodged with the Government by these banks on which they transact their business, and now in readjusting the national debt it is deemed advisable and for the public interests that the securities should be at a lower rate of interest than when they were originally deposited. Is it not right for Congress to require that? I cannot see the wrong in it. I cannot see any doubt on the question. To my mind it is clear; it is absolutely within the province of Congress, in the exercise of the discretion which it originally retained over this whole subject. I hope, therefore, that in this debate we shall not be pressed too much with the suggestion that we cannot coerce these banks. If the occasion requires, and if the term be applicable, then do I say we may coerce these banks to the extent of obliging them to take these securities at a reduced rate of interest. I find no Repudiation in that. I find nothing wrong in that. I find nothing in it but a simple measure in harmony with this great process of Financial Reconstruction in which we are now engaged. I call it Financial Reconstruction; and in this work ought not the banks to take their place and perform their part? * * * * * Now, Sir, I have a criticism on this section. It does not go far enough. The Committee propose that the banks shall take one third of the three different kinds of bonds, the five, the four and a half, and the four per cents. I think they ought to be required to take all in fours, and I propose to give the Senate an opportunity of expressing its judgment on that proposition. I may be voted down; perhaps I shall be; but I shall make a motion, in the honest endeavor to render this bill a practical measure, which can best succeed. I wish to mature it; I wish to put it in the best shape possible; and for the sake of the banks, and in the interest of the banks, I wish such a measure as shall have a reasonable chance of stability in the future. If you allow the banks gains that are too large, there will necessarily be a constant opposition, growing and developing as their gains become more conspicuous. Why expose the system to any such criticism? Let us now revise it carefully, place it on sure, but moderate foundations, so that it will have in itself the elements of future stability.