Bearing in mind these facts, several difficulties which have been presented during this debate disappear. For instance, a question was put by a learned Senator [Mr. DAVIS, of Kentucky] as to the validity of an imagined seizure of the property of the eminent Judge Wayne, situated in the District of Columbia. But it is obvious that the facts in the imagined case of the eminent judge are different from those in the actual case before us. Judge Wayne, unlike the petitioner, was domiciled in a loyal part of the country; and his property, unlike that of the petitioner, was situated in a loyal part of the country. This difference between the two cases serves to illustrate the position of the petitioner. Because property situated in the District of Columbia and belonging to a loyal judge domiciled here could not be taken, it by no means follows that property situated in a Rebel State and belonging to a person domiciled there can enjoy the same immunity. Behind the fact of domicile, and the fact that the property was situated in a Rebel State, is that other fact, equally incontrovertible, that it was taken in the exigencies of war. The military order under which the taking occurred declares that “the necessities of the Army require the use of every building in Decatur,”--not merely the building in question, but every building; and the Report of the Committee says that “General Sherman had previously issued an order to fortify Decatur for a military post.” I might quote more to illustrate this point; but I quote enough. It is plain and indisputable that the taking was under an exigency of war. To deny this is to assail the military order under which it was done, and also the Report of the Committee. * * * * * Three men once governed the mighty Roman world. Three facts govern the present case, with the power of a triumvirate,--the domicile of the petitioner, the situation of the property, and the exigency of war. If I dwell on these three facts, it is because I am unwilling that either should drop out of sight; each is important. Together they present a case which it is easy to decide, however painful the conclusion. And this brings me to the principle which I said at the beginning was so simple. Indeed, let the facts be admitted, and it is difficult to see how there can be any question in the present case. But the facts, as I have stated them, are indubitable. On these facts two questions arise: first, as to the rule of International Law applicable to property of persons domiciled in an enemy country; and, secondly, as to the applicability of this rule to the present case. Of the rule there can be no question; its applicability is sustained by reason, and also by authority from which there can be no appeal.