Now, Sir, allow me to say,--I say it with entire respect,--the confusion in this debate has arisen from confounding the rule of law with the evidence under that rule. The rule, I say, is precise, that there must be intent. But how shall the intent be proved? Sometimes in one way, sometimes in another; sometimes by long-continued residence,--by purchase of property,--by the establishment of a home,--by the establishment of a place of business,--by all those circumstances and incidents which show fixity of purpose. All this comes under the head of evidence. It does not touch the rule of law behind. The Senator from Illinois says there must be an act. Allow me to say that words are sometimes acts, and especially if associated with important events. It is a familiar phrase of law that language enters into what we call the _res gestæ_; language is welded into the transaction and becomes a part of it. Words then become things; and when were words more things than when the commanding general in Mississippi distinctly declared his purpose to resign his commission in the Army of the United States and accept a nomination as Senator? Here was a declaration constituting part of the _res gestæ_, and in itself an act. I am not speaking merely on theory. I have in my hand a case, which I think, when I read it, you will see is applicable: I refer to Metcalf’s Reports, volume three, page 200, the case of _Kilburn_ v. _Bennett_. In the statement of facts is the following passage:-- “For the purpose of showing with what intent the defendant went to Tyngsborough on the 27th of April, he offered to prove that about three weeks before that day he told S. Shattuck, in whose house he then resided, that he should leave Groton before the 1st of May, and remove with his family to Tyngsborough, to reside at his brother’s, and make his house a home, until he should go to Illinois. But the judge ruled that the evidence was inadmissible, and rejected it.” The case was carried before the full bench, when the ruling of the judge below was set aside, and the Court observed as follows:--