[Sidenote: If God from eternity doth foreknow not only the works, but the designs and wills of men, there can be no liberty of will--nor can there be any other action or will than that which a Divine and infallible Providence hath foreseen.] ¶ For whiche yif þat god knoweþ by-forn nat oonly þe werkes of men. but also hir conseils {and} hir willes. þan ne shal þer be no 4448 liberte of arbitre. ne certys þer ne may ben noon oþer dede ne no wille but þilke whiche þe deuyne purueaunce þat ne may nat ben desseiued haþ feled byforn [Sidenote: For if things fall out contrary to such foreseeing, and are wrested another way, the prescience of God in regard to futurity would not be sure and unerring--it would be nothing but an uncertain opinion of them: but I take it to be impious and unlawful to believe this of God.] ¶ For yif þat þei myȝten wryþen awey in oþer manere þan þei 4452 ben purueyed. þan ne sholde þer ben no stedfast p{re}science of þinge to comen but raþer an vncerteyn oppiniou{n}. þe whiche þinge to trowen on god I deme it felonie {and} vnleueful. [Sidenote: Nor do I approve of the reasoning made use of by some. For they say that a thing is not necessarily to happen because God hath foreseen it, but rather because it is to happen it cannot be hid from the divine Providence.] ¶ Ne I ne proeue nat þilk 4456 same resou{n}. as who seiþ I ne allowe nat. or I ne p{re}ise nat þilke same resou{n} by whiche þat som men wenen þat þei mowen assoilen {and} vnknytten þe knot of þis questiou{n}. ¶ For certys þei seyn þ{a}t þing nis nat to 4460 come for þat þe purueaunce of god haþ seyn it byforn{e}. þat is to comen but raþer þe cont{ra}rie. ¶ And þat is þis þat for þat þe þing is to comen þat þerfore ne may it nat ben hyd fro þe purueaunce of god. 4464 [Sidenote: [* fol. 35.]] [Sidenote: Now by this reason necessity appears to change sides. For it is not necessary that the things which are foreseen should happen, but it is necessary that the things which are to befall should be foreseen.] *{and} in þis manere þis necessite slydiþ aȝein in to þe [[pg 155]] contrarie p{ar}tie. ne it ne byhoueþ [nat] nedes þat þinges bytiden þat ben ypurueid. [but it by-houeth nedes / þ{a}t thinges þ{a}t ben to comyn ben yporueyid] but as it 4468 were yt{ra}uailed. [Sidenote: As if the question was, which was the cause of the other--_prescience_ the cause of the necessity of future events, or the _necessity_ the cause of the prescience of future events?]