Chaucerian and Other Pieces: Being a Supplement to the Complete Works of Geoffrey Chaucer
General
Chaucerian and Other Pieces: Being a Supplement to the Complete Works of Geoffrey Chaucer
Chaucer, Geoffrey, -1400
'Certes,' quod Love, 'bicause this mater is good and necessary
to declare, I thinke here-in wel to abyde, and not lightly to passe.
Thou shalt not (quod she) say al-only, "god beforn wot me to be
a lover or no lover," but thus: "god beforn wot me to be a lover 45
without necessitè." And so foloweth, whether thou love or not love,
every of hem is and shal be. But now thou seest the impossibilitè
of the case, and the possibilitè of thilke that thou wendest
had been impossible; wherfore the repugnaunce is adnulled.'
'Ye,' quod I; 'and yet do ye not awaye the strength of necessitè, 50
whan it is said, th[r]ough necessitè it is me in love to
abyde, or not to love without necessitè for god beforn wot it.
This maner of necessitè forsothe semeth to some men in-to coaccion,
that is to sayne, constrayning, or else prohibicion, that is,
defendinge; wherfore necessitè is me to love of wil. I understande 55
me to be constrayned by some privy strength to the wil
of lovinge; and if [I] no[t] love, to be defended from the wil of
lovinge: and so thorow necessitè me semeth to love, for I love;
or els not to love, if I not love; wherthrough neither thank ne
maugrè in tho thinges may I deserve.' 60
'Now,' quod she, 'thou shalt wel understande, that often we
sayn thing thorow necessitè to be, that by no strength to be
neither is coarted ne constrayned; and through necessitè not
to be, that with no defendinge is removed. For we sayn it is
thorow necessitè god to be immortal, nought deedliche; and it 65
is necessitè, god to be rightful; but not that any strength of
violent maner constrayneth him to be immortal, or defendeth him
to be unrightful; for nothing may make him dedly or unrightful.
Right so, if I say, thorow necessitè is thee to be a lover or els
noon; only thorow wil, as god beforn wete. It is nat to understonde 70
that any thing defendeth or forbit thee thy wil, whiche shal
nat be; or els constrayneth it to be, whiche shal be. That same
thing, forsoth, god before wot, whiche he beforn seeth. Any
thing commende of only wil, that wil neyther is constrayned
ne defended thorow any other thing. And so thorow libertè of 75
arbitrement it is do, that is don of wil. And trewly, my good
child, if these thinges be wel understonde, I wene that non
inconvenient shalt thou fynde betwene goddes forweting and
libertè of arbitrement; wherfore I wot wel they may stande
togider. Also farthermore, who that understanding of prescience 80
properlich considreth, thorow the same wyse that any-thing be
afore wist is said, for to be comming it is pronounced; there is
nothing toforn wist but thing comming; foreweting is but of
trouth[e]; dout[e] may nat be wist; wherfore, whan I sey that god
toforn wot any-thing, thorow necessitè is thilke thing to be comming; 85
al is oon if I sey, it shal be.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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