China's Revolution, 1911-1912: A Historical and Political Record of the Civil WarDingle, Edwin John
History
China's Revolution, 1911-1912: A Historical and Political Record of the Civil War
Dingle, Edwin John
China -- History -- Revolution, 1911-1912
The Peking Government had the advantage of being recognised by
foreign nations, a condition which would continue while it remained
in possession of the capital and any considerable region surrounding
it. It had almost all of the modern drilled army, and a great {190}
majority of the trained officers. It had better military equipment.
The Government still controlled the Imperial railways of North China,
the Peking-Hankow Railway, and the Tientsin-Pukou Railway over the
greater part. Thus it would be able to concentrate troops at any
given point along or north of the Yangtze more easily than the
Revolutionists. Moreover, the Imperial troops were accustomed to and
equipped to endure a cold climate, and winter had the northern part
of the country in its grip. What forces the Revolutionaries could
put in the field north of the Yangtze River was not definitely known.
Except a few thousand trained troops, any army assembled for the
purpose of advancing upon Peking or resisting an advance of the
Imperial Army would be composed of raw recruits officered in the main
by inexperienced men. Such an army would be ill provided to
undertake a winter campaign in the north. Without further analysis
the mooted march of a Revolutionary Army to Peking could be dismissed
as visionary, unless it was assumed that the Imperial Army was
disloyal and would desert the Government. There was now no very
tangible basis for such an expectation. Yuan Shih K'ai, the creator
of the new army which had always been loyal to him, still held the
respect of the soldiers. It was one thing for the new army and its
leaders to be dissatisfied with the old order of things at Peking: it
was quite another to assume that it was dissatisfied with the form of
government proposed by Yuan Shih K'ai, its former and present
commander. The army knew Yuan, and what to expect from him. It did
not know the Revolutionary leaders, except one here and there, and it
did not know what treatment it would receive from a Revolutionary
Government after what had happened. If it were assumed that the
Northern Army would remain loyal to Yuan Shih K'ai, an early
occupation of Peking by the Revolutionists was practically
impossible. This was a task which would require a campaign of a year
{191} or perhaps more--if it could ever be accomplished. The
Imperialists might not have been able to penetrate south of the
Yangtze, but they would have had no great difficulty in holding the
territory under their control. And in the event of schisms and
disintegration of the Republicans, the Government should have been
able in time to recover its dominion in all the provinces. This was
a phase which the Revolutionists had to consider. Hitherto the
processes of disintegration and discontent had worked almost
altogether in their favour.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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