China's Revolution, 1911-1912: A Historical and Political Record of the Civil WarDingle, Edwin John
History
China's Revolution, 1911-1912: A Historical and Political Record of the Civil War
Dingle, Edwin John
China -- History -- Revolution, 1911-1912
Prolongation of hostilities, therefore, would seem to presage a
temporary, perhaps a permanent, division of the Empire into two
parts, and the subjection of the country and the people to the
horrors and disasters which inevitably attend such internecine
struggles. The calamities which would befall under these
circumstances were obvious. Six months of such conditions would
probably create a counter-revolution in the southern provinces.
Conditions in the north would have been somewhat similar, but
probably not so bad, as the Government had a firmer grip on affairs
and would be able to keep outlawry within bounds. In this discussion
it is assumed, of course, that Chinese would be left to fight it out
among themselves, without foreign intervention. Foreign
intervention, which it would be difficult to avoid if hostilities
were to be prolonged indefinitely, would bring its own problems and
dangers. Such aspects were presented by the alternative of war.
These were some of the chief considerations which were to weigh upon
the plenipotentiaries. There seemed only one point of serious
divergence--whether the new Government would follow the Monarchical
or the Republican form. If the former were elected, it probably
would mean that the present Dynasty would be retained, although
perhaps reigning under a different name, for neither Revolutionists
nor Monarchists had another emperor to propose. If a Republic were
to be decided {192} upon, the Government which would be instituted
would differ only in title from a Constitutional Monarchy; therefore,
the argument was more about mere terms than about realities.
Objections to the retention of the monarchy were based upon two
principal theories. One was that with the Manchu Dynasty on the
throne the liberty of the Chinese would not be secure--that the
Dynasty must be overthrown and the capital removed from Peking in
order to shake off for ever the atmosphere and associations of the
old regime. Another objection was that, under the monarchical form,
Yuan Shih K'ai would be virtual dictator, and then he would use his
power to place himself on the throne. In certain quarters Yuan was
certainly credited with having this ambition--as one Chinese put it,
he wanted to be China's Napoleon, not her George Washington. But it
seemed that if Yuan had this ambition, a Republic such as would of
necessity exist in China would be exactly what he would want.
Napoleon began his rise to power as a Republican. If Yuan desired to
make himself emperor, he could adopt no more favourable course than
to accept the presidency of a Republic now, biding his time, as
Napoleon did, until the inevitable reaction set in, and the
transition back to an Empire would be comparatively easy. On the
other hand, continuation of the Dynasty and Imperial forms
constituted a check on such ambition, if it existed, for it provided
a focus for loyalty of the people without in any practical way
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
Reviews
Reviews
No reviews yet
Be the first to share your thoughts on this work.
Elsewhere in the archive
Join the Discussion
Join the discussion
Sign in to leave a comment or review.
Sign InorCreate an account