place to do so. It was destined by him as a “receptacle for all such profitable observations and axioms as fall not within the compass of the special parts of philosophy or sciences, but are more common, and of a higher stage.” He mentions himself some of these axioms, such as—“_Si inæqualibus æqualia addas, omnia erunt inæqualia;_” “_Quæ in eodem tertio conveniunt, et inter se conveniunt;_” “_Omnia mutantur, nil interit._” The problem of the possibility of knowledge would generally be classed under metaphysics; but what Bacon calls _Metaphysique_ is, with him, a branch of philosophy treating only on Formal and Final Causes, in opposition to _Physique_, which treats on Material and Efficient Causes. If we adopt Bacon’s division of philosophy, we might still expect to find the fundamental problem discussed in his chapter on Human Philosophy; but here, again, he treats man only as a part of the continent of Nature, and when he comes to consider the substance and nature of the soul or mind, he declines to enter into this subject, because “the true knowledge of the nature and state of soul must come by the same inspiration that gave the substance.” There remains, therefore, but one place in Bacon’s cyclopædia where we might hope to find some information on this subject,—namely, where he treats on the faculties and functions of the mind, and in particular, of understanding and reason. And here he dwells indeed on the doubtful evidence of the senses as one of the causes of error so frequently pointed out by other philosophers. But he remarks that, though they charged the deceit upon the senses, their chief errors arose from a different cause, from the weakness of their intellectual powers, and from the manner of collecting and concluding upon the reports of the senses. And he then points to what is to be the work of his life,—an improved system of invention, consisting of the _Experientia Literata_, and the _Interpretatio Naturæ_.