Christianity and Ethics: A Handbook of Christian EthicsAlexander, Archibald B. D. (Archibald Browning Drysdale)
Religion
Christianity and Ethics: A Handbook of Christian Ethics
Alexander, Archibald B. D. (Archibald Browning Drysdale)
Christian ethics
Strictly speaking rights and duties are correlative. Every right
carries with it an obligation; not merely in the objective sense that
when one man has a right other men are under the obligation to respect
it, but also in the subjective sense that when a man has a right he is
bound to use it for the general good. It is sometimes said, 'A man may
do what he likes with his own.' Legally that may be true, but morally
he is under obligation to employ it for the general good just as
strictly as if it were another's. A man's rights are not merely
decorations or ends in themselves. They are opportunities,
instruments, trusts. And when any man has them, it means that he is
placed on a vantage-ground from which, secure of oppression or
interference, he may begin to do his duty.[6] But this moral aspect of
right is often lost sight of. People are so enamoured of what they
call their rights that they forget that the real value of every right
depends upon the use to which they put it. A man's freedom does not
consist in having rights, but in fulfilling them. 'After all,' says
Mazzini, 'the greatest right a man can possess or recognise--the
greatest gift of all--is simply the privilege and obligation to do his
duty.'[7] This is the only Christian doctrine of rights. It underlies
our Lord's teaching in the parable of the Talents. We only have what
we use.
(1) Much has been written of the 'Natural rights of Man.'[8] This was
the claim of a school of political philosophy of {204} which Paine was
the most rigorous exponent. The contentions of Paine were met as
vigorously by the negations of Bentham and Burke. And if it be
supposed that the individual is born into the world with certain
ready-made possessions, fixed and unalterable, the claim is untenable.
Such an artificial account of man ignores entirely the evolution of
moral nature, and denies the possibility of development in man's
conception of law and duty. 'It is,' as Wundt says, 'to derive all the
moral postulates that have been produced in our minds by previous moral
development from moral life as it actually exists.'[9]
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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