Christianity and Ethics: A Handbook of Christian EthicsAlexander, Archibald B. D. (Archibald Browning Drysdale)
Religion
Christianity and Ethics: A Handbook of Christian Ethics
Alexander, Archibald B. D. (Archibald Browning Drysdale)
Christian ethics
(3) Finally, the question as to whether there are any acts which are
indifferent, permissible, but neither enjoined nor forbidden, must also
be answered in the negative. If the Christian can do no more than his
duty, because in every single action he seeks to fulfil the whole will
of God, it is clear that there can be no moment of life that can be
thought of not determined by the divine will. There is no part of life
that is colourless. There must be no dropped stitches in the texture
of the Christian character.
It is most frequently in the domain of amusement that the notion of the
'Permissible' is applied. It has been contended that as recreation
really lies outwith the Christian sphere, it may be allowed to
Christian people as a concession to human weakness.[4] But can this
position be vindicated? Relaxation is as much a need of man as work,
and must, equally with it, be brought within the scope of Christian
conduct. We have no business to engage in any activity, whether
involving pleasure or pain, that we cannot justify to our conscience.
Are not the joys of life, and even its amusements, among God's gifts
designed for the enriching of character? And may not they, too, be
consecrated to the glory of God? We are to use the world while not
abusing it, for all things are ours if we are Christ's. Over every
department of life the law of Christ is sovereign, and the ultimate
principle applicable to all problems of duty is, 'Whatsoever ye do in
word or deed do all to the glory of God.'
3. _Rights and Duties_.--The foregoing question as to the scope of
duty leads naturally to the consideration of the relation of duties and
rights. It is usual to distinguish {203} between legal and moral
rights; but at bottom they are one. The rights which I legally claim
for myself I am morally bound to grant to others. A right is expressed
in the form of a permission; a duty, of an imperative. I may or may
not demand my legal rights; morally, I must perform my duties. But, on
the other hand, a right may be secured by legal compulsion; a duty, as
a moral obligation, can never be enforced by external power: it needs
our own assent.[5]
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