other existences!" If the fame of Pythagoras had rested on such "airy nothings," it would have melted away before the time of Plato. [Footnote 431: "History of Ancient Philosophy," vol. i. p. 359.] [Footnote 432: "Biographical History of Philosophy," p. 38.] We grant there is considerable force in the argument of Lewes. He urges, with some pertinence, the unquestionable fact that Aristotle asserts, again and again, that the Pythagoreans taught "that numbers are the principles and substance of things as well as the causes of their modifications;" and he argues that we are not justified in rejecting the authority of Aristotle, unless better evidence can be produced. So far, however, as the authority of Aristotle is concerned, even Lewes himself charges him, in more than one instance, with strangely misrepresenting the opinions of his predecessors.[433] Aristotle is evidently wanting in that impartiality which ought to characterize the historian of philosophy, and, sometimes, we are compelled to question his integrity. Indeed, throughout his "Metaphysics" he exhibits the egotism and vanity of one who imagines that he alone, of all men, has the full vision of the truth. In Books I. and XII. he uniformly associates the "_numbers_" of Pythagoras with the "_forms_" and "_ideas_" of Plato. He asserts that Plato identifies "forms" and "numbers," and regards them as real entities--substances, and causes of all other things. "_Forms are numbers_[434]... so Plato affirmed, similar with the Pythagoreans; and the dogma that numbers are causes to other things--of their substance-_he, in like manner, asserted with them_."[435] And then, finally, he employs the _same_ arguments in refuting the doctrines of both. [Footnote 433: "Aristotle uniformly speaks disparagingly of Anaxagoras" (Lewes's "Biographical History of Philosophy"). He represents him as employing mind (νοῦς) simply as "a _machine_" for the production of the world;--"when he finds himself in perplexity as to the cause of its being necessarily an orderly system, he then drags it (mind) in by force to his assistance" "Metaphysics," (bk. i. ch. iv.). But he is evidently inconsistent with himself, for in "De Anima" (bk. i. ch. ii.) he tells us that "Anaxagoras saith that mind is at once a _cause of motion_ in the whole universe, and also of _well_ and _fit_." We may further ask, is not the idea of fitness--of the good and the befitting--the final cause, even according to Aristotle?