In the Virginia convention we hear Madison, who drafted and suggested the Fifth Article at Philadelphia, speak of the important distinction between the makers of the _federal_ Articles of 1781, only seven years made, when we sit in that Virginia convention, and the “convention” makers of the proposed Articles of the new _national_ Constitution. If these “conventions” make it, he says, it will be a government established, not through the intervention of the legislatures _but by the people at large_. Fie goes on to say “In this particular respect, the distinction between the existing and proposed governments is very material. The existing system has been derived from the dependent derivative authority of the legislatures of the _states_; whereas this is derived from the _superior_ power of the _people_. If we look at the manner in which alterations are to be made,” now referring directly to the Fifth Article, “the same idea is, in some degree, attended to.” (3 _Ell. Deb._ 94.) We feel that it will be quite difficult, when we come later to the constitutional thinkers of 1917 and 1920, for them to convince us that Madison meant his Fifth Article to alter “the dependent derivative authority of the legislatures of the state” and, whenever another government makes the suggestion, put that dependent authority above what he calls “the superior power of the people.” And we feel that these “constitutional thinkers” will find it impossible to convince us when we recall Madison’s other words, directly referring to his Fifth Article and the existing power of the people, mentioned therein by the word “conventions.” These are the words to which we allude: “Were it [his Fifth Article] wholly national, the supreme and ultimate authority would reside in the _majority_ of the people of the Union, and this authority would be competent at all times, like that of a majority of every national society, to alter or abolish its established government.” It is Madison himself who puts the one word “majority” in italics. He does so to call attention to the fact that his Article leaves “the supreme and ultimate authority” in the _people_ (named as “conventions” in his Article) but not necessarily capable of exercise by the _majority_ in any _constitutional_ manner. He goes on to explain this very fact by saying that when the mode of procedure prescribed in his Article is read, it is found that “in requiring more than a majority, and particularly in computing the proportion by _states_, not by _citizens_, it departs from the _national_ and advances towards the _federal_ character.” (_Fed._ No. 39.)