In a second brief, in a different case, the same distinguished lawyer of 1920 is found bringing into bold relief another part of our knowledge so intimately connected with the supposed new constitution of government, the Eighteenth Amendment. And it is a part of our knowledge which challenges a new constitution made entirely by governments without any action by ourselves, the people or the “conventions” named repeatedly in the Constitution made by themselves. In that other brief, we find him stating as one of the propositions on which he bases his argument, “What the expression ‘legislatures of the several states’ meant as used in Article V, when that Article was adopted as a part of the Constitution, it means now.” The statement being undeniably true, he immediately proceeds to urge, with equal truth, that “however popular approval or disapproval [i.e., the _direct_ action of the people themselves, as, for example, in the ‘conventions’ whence, as he already stated, _our_ Constitution proceeded ‘directly from the people’] may be invoked, the people do not become a ‘legislature.’... As well confound the creator and the creature--the principal and the agent through which he acts.” This is the echo of Marshall’s clear statement of the vital distinction between the same “legislatures” (who never are the people and never have the reserved ability of the people) and the “people” or “conventions” (which are the people and have the exclusive ability of the people). We recall the tribute paid to this distinction at Philadelphia. We recall the legal decision there, a decision based squarely on that distinction, that the legislative ability to make _federal_ Articles could not constitute new government of men, as did the First Article, and that all Articles like it or the new Eighteenth Amendment must go to the “people” of the Tenth Amendment, the “conventions” of the Seventh and Fifth Articles. We recall Marshall’s appreciation of the accuracy of that legal decision, when he mentioned that the ability of the state governments or legislatures had been competent to make the _federal_ Articles of 1781 but, when it was proposed to constitute government of men, to vest the _national_ powers of the _national_ First Article, “the necessity of deriving those powers directly from the people [the “conventions” of the Seventh Article] was known and recognized by all.” We remember that the “people” or “conventions,” so recognizing and knowing, mentioned themselves in the Fifth Article so that no one ever should forget the similar legal necessity that every Article like the First, such as the new Article, must always be made by those “conventions” so mentioned. It is, therefore, with considerable satisfaction that we read, in this brief of 1920, the clear echo of all these settled facts, the knowledge that “legislatures” never are the people and never become the people. “As well confound the creator and the creature--the principal and the agent.”