“When the gentleman says, the Constitution is a compact between the states, he uses language exactly applicable to the old Confederation. He speaks as if he were in Congress before 1789. He describes fully that old state of things then existing. The Confederation was, in strictness, a compact; the states, as states, were parties to it. We had no other general government. But that was found insufficient, and inadequate to the public exigencies. The _people_ were not satisfied with it, and undertook to establish a better. _They_ undertook to form a general government which would stand on a new basis--not a confederacy, not a league, not a compact between states, but a constitution; a popular government, founded in popular election, directly responsible to the people themselves, and divided into branches, with prescribed _limits of power_, and prescribed duties. _They_ ordained such a government; _they_ gave it the name of a constitution; and therein _they_ established a distribution of powers between this, their general government, and their several state governments. When _they_ shall have become dissatisfied with this distribution, _they_ can alter it. _Their own power over their own instrument remains._ But until _they_ shall alter it, it must stand as _their_ will, and is equally binding on the general government and on the states.” (Webster’s concluding remarks in the reply to Hayne, 4 _Ell. Deb._ 518.) Is not the same doctrine certain from the Court which knew the whole Constitution so well that it decided, in the important case of Barron v. Mayor of Baltimore, supra, p. 376, that the entire Constitution gave no power of any kind to the state governments? Is not the same doctrine certain from the Court which held: The powers the people have given to the General Government are named in the Constitution, and all not there named, either expressly or by implication, are reserved to the people, and can be exercised only by them, or upon further grant from them. (Turner v. Williams, 194 _U. S._ 279 at 296.)