Civilization and ethics : $b The philosophy of civilization, part 2Schweitzer, Albert
Philosophy
Civilization and ethics : $b The philosophy of civilization, part 2
Schweitzer, Albert
Civilization -- History; Ethics
The more extensive a man’s activities, the oftener he finds himself in
the situation of having to sacrifice something of his humanity to his
supra-personal responsibility. Out of this conflict consideration
brings the average person to the decision that the wider
responsibility does, as a matter of principle, annul the personal. It
is with this idea [pg 263] that society addresses the individual. For
the quieting of consciences for which this decision is too categorical
it perhaps lays down a few principles which undertake to determine in
a way that is valid for everybody, how far in any case personal
morality can have a say in the matter.
To the current ethic no course remains open but to sign this
capitulation. It has no means of defending the fortress of personal
morality, because it has not at its disposal any absolute notions of
good and evil. Not so the ethic of reverence for life. That possesses,
as we can see, what the other lacks. It therefore never surrenders the
fortress, even if the latter is permanently invested. It feels itself
in a position to persevere in holding it, and by continual sorties to
keep the besiegers on the _qui vive_.
Only the most universal and absolute purposiveness in the maintenance
and promotion of life, which is the objective aimed at by reverence
for life, is ethical. All other necessity or expediency is not
ethical, but only a more or less necessary necessity, or a more or
less expedient expediency. In the conflict between the maintenance of
my own existence and the destruction of, or injury to, another, I can
never put the ethical and the necessary together to form a relative
ethical; I must choose between ethical and necessary, and, if I choose
the latter, must take it upon myself to be guilty through an act of
injury to life. Similarly I am not at liberty to think that in the
conflict between personal and supra-personal responsibility I can
balance the ethical and the expedient to make a relative ethical, or
even annul the ethical with the purposive; I must choose between the
two. If under the pressure of the supra-personal responsibility I
yield to the expedient, I become guilty in some way or other through
failure in reverence for life.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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