Civilization and ethics : $b The philosophy of civilization, part 2Schweitzer, Albert
Philosophy
Civilization and ethics : $b The philosophy of civilization, part 2
Schweitzer, Albert
Civilization -- History; Ethics
In the course of the fifth century B.C. Sophists appear, and begin to
concern themselves critically with the accepted standards of value
current for social life and individual activities._(_3_)_ The result
is annihilating. The more moderate of these “Enlighteners” proclaim the
overwhelming majority of these standards which pass for moral to be
merely claims made by society on its members, leaving open thereby the
possibility that a small remainder may be able to prove themselves to
rational consideration as moral in [pg 033] themselves. But the
younger radical sophists maintain the position that all morality, like
all current law, has been invented by organized society in its own
interest. Hence the thinking man who is freeing himself from this
tutelage will make his own moral standards, and will follow in them
nothing but his own pleasure and interests. Thus Western philosophical
thought about the problem of ethics and civilisation starts with a
shrill dissonance.
What was Socrates (470-399 B.C.) able to contribute, when he came
forward to oppose this tendency?
In the place of the simply pleasurable he put the rationally
pleasurable.
By rational consideration, he asserts, it is possible to establish a
standard of action in which the happiness of the individual, rightly
understood, is in harmony with the interests of society. Virtue
consists in right knowledge.
That the rationally moral is that which procures for the agent true
pleasure, or, what means the same thing, true profit, Socrates draws
out into the most diverse applications in the simple everyday
discussions which Xenophon has transmitted to us in his
_Memorabilia_._(_4_)_ The dialogues of Plato show him going beyond
this primitive utilitarianism, and seeking a conception of the good
which has been made something inward and aims at the well-being of the
soul; which stands, too, in relationship with the beautiful._(_5_)_
How much of these more advanced views are the Master’s own, and how
much of his own thoughts his pupil has in this way put into his mouth,
cannot now be decided.
That Socrates spoke of an inner, mysterious voice, the “daimonion”, as
being the highest moral authority in man is indeed certain, for it is
mentioned in his indictment. His [pg 034] utilitarian rationalism is
therefore completed by a kind of mysticism. An empirical ethic, that
is, one established out of past experience and with a view to future
experience, and an intuitive ethic live in him side by side and
undistinguished from one another, to be separated later and developed
in contrast to one another in his pupils, the Cynics and Cyrenaics on
the one hand, and Plato on the other.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
Reviews
Reviews
No reviews yet
Be the first to share your thoughts on this work.
Join the Discussion
Join the discussion
Sign in to leave a comment or review.
Sign InorCreate an account