If Hume and Adam Smith had suspected the far-reaching character of this great problem of ethics which they brought into the field of discussion, they would have had to go on and settle the extent and the depth of this sympathy which they adopted in their scheme, in order to understand how it continues to function in the domain of thought. But they fail to notice the far-reaching character of what they lay down, and believe they have done nothing but give by means of psychology an explanation of altruism which is superior to these currents. The spirit of the time, in its wonderful capacity for holding various ideas side by side, takes possession of their view, and the popular utilitarianism now confidently appeals to it as declaring that altruism is to be conceived as a rational ennobling of egoism, as a result of the influence of society, and in addition as a manifestation of a natural instinct. It is, really, only in appearance that the psychological conception of ethics imparts new life to utilitarianism. It is rather a consumption germ which the latter absorbs. The establishment of a natural element in ethics, when the consequences of it begin to make themselves felt, can only end in its devouring rationalist utilitarianism, as becomes evident in the nineteenth century when biological thought becomes influential in ethics. The funeral procession of rationalist utilitarianism begins to assemble with Hume and Adam Smith, though it is a long time before the coffin is taken to the cemetery. The English ethic of self-perfecting Against the utilitarians, who would derive from the content of the moral the essential nature of it, and the [pg 085] obligation to morality, the “Intellectualists” and the “Intuitionists” enter the lists. The empirical derivation of ethics seems to them to be an endangering of the majesty of the moral. Morality—this is the thought before their minds—is a striving after perfection, and this develops itself in us because it is implanted in us by nature. Action for the common advantage does not by any means constitute ethics; it is only a manifestation of the struggle after self-perfecting. To this deeper and more comprehensive conception of ethics, however, the Intellectualists and Intuitionists do not give correct expression. For that they are still too much entangled in a lifeless and semi-scholastic philosophizing. Their chief strength lies in their showing up of the weaknesses of the foundation which Hobbes and Locke give to ethics, and to these they principally devote themselves, bringing to their task a great deal that is correct about the directly and absolutely binding character of the moral law. That the meaning of the moral is not to be found merely in the useful character of the actions inspired by it but also in the self-perfecting of the agent which is effected by them, and that morality presupposes a moral personality, is emphasized by them in many happy turns of expression.