When, however, the task before them is to describe exactly in what way men carry in them the idea of the good as a force which works effectively upon their character, the Intellectualists and the Intuitionists land themselves in a psychologizing which is sometimes ingenious, but often artificial and commonplace. They occupy themselves with logical distinctions instead of investigating in a practical fashion the nature of man. Instead of really developing the problem in answer to the innovators, they work at it with data taken from an out-of-date philosophy. They hark back largely to Plato, and again they argue largely, anxiously or unconsciously, not as philosophers, but as theologians. On individual points they diverge from each other, and [pg 086] attack each other’s positions according as they would have the foundations of the ethical more intellectualist, or more sentimental and mystical, or more theological. The majority of these anti-utilitarians belong to the Cambridge Platonizing school. We must name here Ralph Cudworth (1617-1688),_(_22_)_ Henry More (1614-1687),_(_23_)_ the Rev. Samuel Clarke (1675-1729),_(_24_)_ Bishop Richard Cumberland (1632-1718),_(_25_)_ and William Wollaston (1659-1724)._(_26_)_ According to Cudworth the truths of morality are just as evident as these of mathematics. For More the ethical is an intellectual power of the soul meant for the control of natural impulses. Cumberland finds the moral law given in the reason which has been bestowed upon man by God. Clarke, living in the thought world of Isaac Newton, sees it as the spiritual phenomenon which corresponds to the law of nature. Wollaston defines it as that which is logically right. Pressed back to their fundamental meaning, these thinkers do nothing but amplify the statement that the ethical is ethical. They assert that the utilitarian view of ethics is pitched too low, but they do not succeed in establishing, in contrast to it, a more exalted principle in such a way that a higher and more comprehensive content of ethics can be derived from it. As to content their ethic does not really differ from that of the utilitarians. It merely lacks the great enthusiastic driving-force which shows itself in the latter. To establish a living ethic of self-perfecting is beyond the capacity of the Intellectualists and the Intuitionists. What is the inner connexion between the struggle for self-perfecting and action for the common advantage? That [pg 087] is the weighty question of ethics which crops up in the settlement of differences between the utilitarians and their conservative opponents. At first it remains veiled, and it does not come to clear expression till we reach Kant. * * * * *